Virtual Currency as Crypto Collateral Under Article 9 of the UCC: Trying to Fit a Square Peg in a Round Hole by Foster, Sharon E.
Arkansas Law Review 
Volume 73 Number 2 Article 2 
August 2020 
Virtual Currency as Crypto Collateral Under Article 9 of the UCC: 
Trying to Fit a Square Peg in a Round Hole 
Sharon E. Foster 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Secured 
Transactions Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sharon E. Foster, Virtual Currency as Crypto Collateral Under Article 9 of the UCC: Trying to Fit a Square 
Peg in a Round Hole, 73 Ark. L. Rev. 263 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol73/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Arkansas Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact 
ccmiddle@uark.edu. 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY AS CRYPTO
COLLATERAL UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE




This Article addresses the current state of academic discus-
sion regarding the problems of creating an enforceable security 
interest under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
using virtual currency, such as bitcoin, as collateral.1  While aca-
demic discussion is helpful and, indeed, may one day be adopted 
by a court and become law, the primary problem in using virtual 
currency as collateral is the uncertainty regarding using Article 9 
to create an enforceable security interest in virtual currency.  
Simply put, Article 9 does not specifically address virtual cur-
rency as collateral, and we have no case law at this time to rely 
upon. 
In addressing this uncertain state of affairs, this Article shall 
examine the four primary considerations regarding creating an en-
forceable security interest: scope, creation, perfection, and trac-
ing.  First, does the scope of Article 9 of the UCC apply to virtual 
currency?  As indicated in Part II, this is not a settled issue.  Vir-
tual currency would probably have to qualify as personal property 
to be covered under the scope provisions of Article 9.  While it 
seems likely that virtual currency will qualify as personal 
* Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law.  The author would like to thank the
University of Arkansas School of Law for its generous summer research grant and Professor 
Carol Goforth for her gentle persuasion in convincing me to tackle this research.  
1. Additional problems regarding virtual currency, including purchase money security
interests, duties regarding collateral, liability risks, proceeds, disposition of collateral, and 
accounting requirements are not discussed in this paper.  However, some of these issues are 
addressed in Fred H. Miller & Alvin C. Harrell, Current Issues: UCC Articles 2 and 2A; 
Virtual Currency, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 59, 66-67 (2017).  For purposes of this pa-
per, I have used the term “virtual currency” rather than “cryptocurrency” or other like terms. 
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property, there is some uncertainty that will only be resolved by 
case law or a revision of Article 9 to clarify this issue.   
Second, the creation of a security interest in virtual currency 
is discussed in Part III.  Here, as with the scope issue, there are 
definitional problems.  Creation of a security interest requires ev-
idence of a voluntary lien by the debtor2 “that provides a descrip-
tion of the collateral.”3  If the collateral is not properly described, 
there is no security interest.4  Current practice is to use UCC de-
fined collateral description, when possible, to avoid a finding of 
an insufficient description.5  However, as with scope, virtual cur-
rency does not neatly fit into the UCC defined collateral descrip-
tions. 
Third, the issue of perfection of the security interest will be 
discussed in Part IV.  As with scope and creation, perfection of a 
security interest depends on the type of collateral.  There are four 
mechanisms for perfection: filing a financing statement, control, 
possession, and automatic perfection.6  As explained in more de-
tail, it is critical that the secured party select the proper mecha-
nism of perfection in order to ensure perfection is achieved and 
priority secured.7  When one does not know the collateral type, as 
with the case of virtual currency, there is the possibility of im-
proper perfection creating significant uncertainty. 
Finally, Part V addresses the problems of tracing.  This issue 
arises in situations where there was the creation and perfection of 
a security interest, but the debtor subsequently transfers the col-
lateral to a third party.8  The first issue to address is whether the 
security interest remains with virtual currency collateral in the 
hands of a third-party transferee.  And second, even if the security 
interest remains, how can the secured party trace specific virtual 
2. U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
3. § 9-203(b)(3)(A); U.C.C. § 9-108 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
4. § 9-108.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 74-80.
6. U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-314
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-312(a)-(b) (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-313(a)-(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2019); U.C.C. § 9-309 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 177-89.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 210-12; U.C.C. § 9-201(a) cmt. 2 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). 
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currency to a third-party transferee?  Given the nature of virtual 
currency, these four issues underscore the current state of com-
mercial inefficiency of Article 9 for virtual currency as collateral. 
II. DOES ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE APPLY?
The first step in determining if a creditor can obtain an en-
forceable security interest in virtual currency is to establish the 
applicability of Article 9 of the UCC.  To ascertain the answer to 
that question, we must look to the scope of Article 9 under section 
9-109:
(a) General scope of article.
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), this
article applies to:
(1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a
security interest in personal property or fixtures by
contract;
(2) an agricultural lien;
(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangi-
bles, or promissory notes;
(4) a consignment;
(5) a security interest arising under Section 2-401, 2-
505, 2-711(3), or 2A-508(5), as provided in Section 9-
110; and
(6) a security interest arising under Section 4-210 or 5-
118.9
Few academic papers examine this first step in detail.  How-
ever, the scope issue has not been settled.  To illustrate, at its Oc-
tober 2019 meeting, the Uniform Law Commission Joint Study 
Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging 
Technologies stated as one of the issues to consider: “Does the 
UCC apply?”10 
9. U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
Section 9-109 also lists transactions to which Article 9 does not apply.  § 9-109(d).  While 
not addressed in this article, issues relating to state, federal, and foreign laws which may 
preempt Article 9 could receive significant attention in the near future.  Brackets originally 
existing in the UCC provisions have been omitted to clearly express any changes made by 
the author. 
10. Joint Study Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging Technol-
ogies, Issues List, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2019), [https://perma.cc/ND3U-NKYF]. 
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A. Is Virtual Currency “Personal Property?”
The general consensus in the academic community assumes 
that virtual currency would be “personal property” under Article 
9.11  If virtual currency is personal property, it would qualify for 
Article 9 coverage under section 9-109(a)(1).12  Currently, virtual 
currency has been defined as “property” by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) for tax purposes.13  In general, the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission (CFTC)14 defines virtual currency us-
ing the IRS definition.15   
That said, it is not at all clear that courts will deem virtual 
currency to be personal property for purposes of Article 9 of the 
UCC.  This is, in part, due to the intangible nature of virtual cur-
rency and courts’ rather conservative view of property as tangible.  
For example, in Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, 
Inc.,16 the court was confronted with whether a domain name was 
truly property or services.17  The court concluded “a domain name 
registration is the product of a contract for services between the 
registrar and registrant,” rather than a true form of personal prop-
erty.18  However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a domain name 
11. See Miller & Harrell, supra note 1, at 66; Lorena Yashira Gely-Rojas, Note, Cryp-
tocurrencies and the Uniform Commercial Code: The Curious Case of Bitcoin, 8 U. P.R. 
BUS. L.J. 129, 134 (2017); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 
24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 18 (2016). 
12. § 9-109(a)(1) (stating that Article 9 applies to “a transaction, regardless of its form,
that creates a security interest in personal property”). 
13. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 [hereinafter I.R.S. Notice] (“For federal
tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as property.  General tax principles applicable to 
property transactions apply to transactions using virtual currency.”) (emphasis added); see 
also Anthony F. Fata & Brian P. O’Connell, The Blockchain Bandwagon: Cryptocurrency 
on the Move, CBA REC., Jan. 2018, at 30.  
14. The CFTC is an independent U.S. governmental agency that regulates the U.S.
commodities including derivatives markets.  “In 2014, the CFTC declared virtual currencies 
to be a ‘commodity’ subject to oversight under its authority under the Commodity Exchange 
Act (CEA).”  CFTC BACKGROUNDER ON OVERSIGHT OF AND APPROACH TO VIRTUAL 
CURRENCY FUTURES MARKETS, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N  1 (Jan. 4, 
2018), [https://perma.cc/CFP9-TRZ2].  CFTC activities regarding cryptocurrency may in-
clude regulating Bitcoin futures exchanges (BitFinex) and enforcing the laws related to de-
rivatives platforms.  Id. 
15. PRIMER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N 4 (Oct. 17, 2017), [https://perma.cc/752A-DY74] [hereinafter CFTC PRIMER]. 
16. Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
17. Id. at 85-86.
18. Id. at 86 (quoting Dorel v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999)) (internal
quotations omitted). 
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is “an intangible property right.”19  This confusion shows judicial 
difficulty in conceptualizing intangible property rights which, in 
turn, creates difficulties in even getting past the first hurdle—does 
Article 9 apply?20  As for the remaining categories of coverage 
under the Article 9 scope provision, an agricultural lien; a sale of 
accounts; chattel paper; payment intangibles or promissory notes; 
a consignment; a security interest arising under sections 2-401, 2-
505, 2-711(3), or 2A-508(5), as provided in section 9-110; and a 
security interest arising under sections 4-210 or 5-118 are most 
likely not applicable.21 
B. Virtual Currency Is Not an “Agricultural Lien”
An “agricultural lien” is defined as “an interest in farm prod-
ucts:” 
(A) which secures payment or performance of an obligation
for:
(i) goods or services furnished in connection with a
debtor’s farming operation; or
(ii) rent on real property leased by a debtor in connec-
tion with its farming operation;
(B) which is created by statute in favor of a person that:
(i) in the ordinary course of its business furnished
goods or services to a debtor in connection with a
debtor’s farming operation; or
(ii) leased real property to a debtor in connection with
the debtor’s farming operation; and
(C) whose effectiveness does not depend on the person’s
possession of the personal property.22
To fall under the scope provision here, virtual currency would 
have to qualify as a farm product, which is highly unlikely.23 
19. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
20. See Christopher K. Odinet, Bitproperty and Commercial Credit, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 649, 680-93 (2017). 
21. See discussion infra Sections Ⅱ.B-I.
22. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(5) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
23. § 9-102(a)(34) (defining “farm products”).
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C. Virtual Currency Is Not an “Account”
For purposes of “sale of accounts,” an “account” is defined 
and discussed in Section III.B.1,24 which concludes that virtual 
currency would not be considered an account.25 
D. Virtual Currency Is Not “Chattel Paper”
“Chattel paper” is defined as a: 
[R]ecord or records that evidence both a monetary obligation
and a security interest in specific goods, a security interest in
specific goods and software used in the goods, a security in-
terest in specific goods and license of software used in the
goods, a lease of specific goods, or a lease of specific goods
and license of software used in the goods.  In this paragraph,
“monetary obligation” means a monetary obligation secured
by the goods or owed under a lease of the goods and includes
a monetary obligation with respect to software used in the
goods.  The term does not include (i) charters or other con-
tracts involving the use or hire of a vessel or (ii) records that
evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit
or charge card or information contained on or for use with
the card.  If a transaction is evidenced by records that include
an instrument or series of instruments, the group of records
taken together constitutes chattel paper.26
First, it is doubtful that virtual currency meets the definition of 
“record,” which is defined as “information that is inscribed on a 
tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other me-
dium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”27  Virtual currency 
is transferable but not retrievable in a perceivable form.  Second, 
a “monetary obligation”28 is the requirement to pay money.29  As 
discussed in Section III.B.6, virtual currency does not qualify as 
money.30   
Finally, virtual currency does not evidence a “security inter-
est” such as an Article 9 security interest.  Virtual currency has 
24. See discussion infra Section Ⅲ.B.1.
25. See § 9-102(a)(2).
26. § 9-102(a)(11) (emphasis added).
27. § 9-102(a)(70).
28. “Monetary obligation” is not defined in the U.C.C.  See § 9-102(a).
29. See Aetna Fin. Co. v. Hendrickson, 526 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
30. See discussion infra Section Ⅲ.B.6.
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variously been defined as: “a digital unit of exchange that is not 
backed by a government-issued legal tender”31; “a medium of ex-
change that operates like a currency in some environments, but 
. . . does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction”32; and “a 
digital representation of value that functions as a medium of ex-
change, a unit of account, and/or a store of value.”33  None of these 
definitions line-up with the definition of a security interest which 
means “an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures 
payment or performance of an obligation.”34  
As indicated above, it is unclear if virtual currency will be 
deemed personal property.35  As for “fixtures,” this is not appli-
cable, as a fixture means “goods that have become so related to 
particular real property that an interest in them arises under real 
property law.”36  This is hardly an attribute of virtual currency.  
Further, the above IRS and CFTC definition of virtual currency 
does not indicate a mechanism to “secure payment or other per-
formance of an obligation.”37 
E. Virtual Currency Is Not a “Payment Intangible”
A “payment intangible” is “a general intangible under which 
the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obliga-
tion.”38  As noted, a monetary obligation39 is the requirement to 
pay money,40 and virtual currency does not meet the definition of 
money.41 
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND
CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 3 
(2013). 
32. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, GUIDANCE
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR 
USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), [https://perma.cc/J7HJ-Q6RD] [hereinafter 
FIN-2013-G001]. 
33. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 13.
34. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added). 
35. See discussion supra Section II.A.
36. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(41) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
37. § 9-102(a)(59).
38. § 9-102(a)(61) (emphasis added).
39. “Monetary obligation” is not defined in Article 9 of the U.C.C.  See § 9-102(a).
40. See Aetna Fin. Co. v. Hendrickson, 526 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
41. See discussion infra Section III.B.6.
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F. Virtual Currency Is Not a “Promissory Note”
A “promissory note” is defined as “an instrument that evi-
dences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence 
an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a 
bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or 
funds.”42  As indicated in Section III.B.4, virtual currency does 
not qualify as an “instrument,”43 and, as discussed above, virtual 
currency does not evidence a promise to pay a monetary obliga-
tion.44 
G. Virtual Currency Is Not a “Consignment”
Under Article 9 of the UCC, “consignment” means: 
[A] transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person de-
livers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:
(A) the merchant:
(i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than
the name of the person making delivery;
(ii) is not an auctioneer; and
(iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be sub-
stantially engaged in selling the goods of others;
(B) with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the
goods is $1,000 or more at the time of delivery;
(C) the goods are not consumer goods immediately before
delivery; and
(D) the transaction does not create a security interest that se-
cures an obligation.45
Here, there is a requirement of a transaction in “goods,” which are 
defined as “all things . . . which are moveable at the time of iden-
tification to the contract for sale . . . .”46  The problem for virtual 
currency lies in the “moveable” requirement.  Generally, to be 
42. § 9-102(a)(65) (emphasis added).
43. See discussion infra Section III.B.4.
44. See discussion supra in Sections II.D-E.
45. § 9-102(a)(20) (emphasis added).
46. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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moveable the item in question must be tangible.47  Virtual cur-
rency is more akin to an intangible.48 
H. Virtual Currency Does Not Qualify Under the Scope
Provisions That Reference UCC Articles 2 and 2A
Sections 2-401, 2-505, 2-711(3), and 2A-508(5) referenced 
under the scope provision of Article 9 apply to Article 2, which 
applies to the sale of goods, or Article 2A, which applies to 
leases.49  The scope of Article 2 is limited to goods,50 which does 
not apply to virtual currency, as discussed above. 
As for Article 2A, its scope is limited to “any transaction . . . 
that creates a lease.”51  A “lease” is defined as “a transfer of the 
right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for con-
sideration . . . .”52  In addition to the probable inapplicability of a 
transfer of a right to possession and use for virtual currency, there 
is the additional inapplicability based on the limitation to goods. 
I. Virtual Currency Does Not Qualify Under the Scope
Provisions That Reference UCC Articles 4 and 5 
As for sections 4-210 and 5-118 under the scope provision 
of Article 9, Article 4 of the UCC addresses bank deposits and 
collections,53 and section 4-210 is specifically limited to a “col-
lecting bank,” which is defined as “a bank handling an item for 
collection except the payor bank.”54  A “bank” is defined as “an 
organization that is engaged in the business of banking.  The term 
47. See Adam Epstein, Sales and Sports Law, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 67, 70
(2008); Nancy S. Kim, Expanding the Scope of the Principles of the Law of Software Con-
tracts to Include Digital Content, 84 TUL. L. Rev. 1595, 1597 (2010); Frank D. Nguyen, 
Regulation of Medical Expert Systems: A Necessary Evil?, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187, 
1199 (1994). 
48. An intangible is not defined in the UCC but is generally defined as something “that
does not exist as a physical thing but is still valuable to a company.”  Intangible, OXFORD 
LEARNER’S DICTIONARIES (last visited Mar. 20, 2020), [https://perma.cc/W5AT-2KKH].   
49. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 2A-102
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). 
50. § 2-102.
51. § 2A-102.
52. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
53. U.C.C. § 4-101 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
54. U.C.C. § 4-105(5) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added). 
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includes savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit un-
ions, and trust companies.”55 
The Official Comments are not much help here: “The re-
vised definition of ‘deposit account’ incorporates the definition of 
‘bank,’ which is new.  The definition derives from the definitions 
of ‘bank’ in Sections 4-105(1) and 4A-105(a)(2), which focus on 
whether the organization is ‘engaged in the business of bank-
ing.’”56 
Case law addressing this issue is unanimous in holding that 
the “business of banking” for purposes of the UCC is a functional 
test, not a question regarding whether the entity is chartered under 
state or federal law.57  Accordingly, an entity that accepts depos-
its, issues notes, provides checking account services, transfers 
funds, and loans is in the business of banking.58  The critical issue 
here is that virtual currency is, in most cases, not held by a bank 
as that term is defined.59 
Article 5 applies to “letters of credit,”60 which are defined as: 
[A] definite undertaking that satisfies the requirements of
Section 5-104 by an issuer to a beneficiary at the request or
for the account of an applicant or, in the case of a financial
institution, to itself or for its own account, to honor a docu-
mentary presentation by payment or delivery of an item of
value.61
Section 5-118 is limited to a security interest for “[a]n issuer or 
nominated person . . . in a document presented under a letter of 
55. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(8) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N  2019).
56. § 9-102 cmt. 12.
57. See Whitaker v. Wedbush Securities, Inc., No. 1-18-1455, 2019 WL 1319858, *2
(Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 21, 2019); Brooks v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, 57 So. 3d 1153, 1159 
(La. Ct. App. 2011); McCray v. Commonwealth, 556 S.E.2d 50, 51 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); 
Childers v. State, 813 N.E.2d 432, 435-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. 
Mishler, 983 P.2d 1086, 1093 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Pinasco v. Del Pilar Ara, 219 A.D.2d 
540, 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Woods v. MONY Legacy Life Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 1070, 
1072 (N.Y. 1994); Morris v. Marshall, 305 S.E.2d 581, 586 (W. Va. 1983).  
58. See Whitaker, 2019 WL 1319858 at *2; Brooks, 57 So. 3d at 1160; McCray, 556
S.E.2d at 51-52; Childers, 813 N.E.2d at 435-36; Mishler, 983 P.2d at 1093; Pinasco, 219 
A.D.2d at 541; Woods, 641 N.E.2d at 1072; Morris, 305 S.E.2d at 586.
59. See Kevin Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REV. 505, 549 (2018).
60. U.C.C. § 5-101 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
61. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(10) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
2020 CRYPTO COLLATERAL 273 
credit . . . .”62  Issuers and nominated persons are usually banks,63 
and section 5-118 requires a “document,” defined as: 
[A] draft or other demand, document of title, investment se-
curity, certificate, invoice, or other record, statement, or rep-
resentation of fact, law, right, or opinion (i) which is pre-
sented in a written or other medium permitted by the letter
of credit or, unless prohibited by the letter of credit, by the
standard practice referred to in Section 5-108(e) and (ii)
which is capable of being examined for compliance with the
terms and conditions of the letter of credit.  A document may
not be oral.64
As the scope of this section is limited to persons, often 
banks, specified in a document, and virtual currency does not 
specify a person nor a document, this provision is inapplicable. 
To recap, the most likely scope provision under Article 9 of 
the UCC to apply would be personal property under section 9-
109(a)(1).  The remaining scope provisions are not applicable. 
III. CREATION OF A SECURITY INTEREST
Assuming a court will determine that virtual currency is per-
sonal property covered by Article 9 of the UCC, step two for a 
creditor would be to properly create a security interest.  To create 
a security interest, there must be a security agreement.65  For the 
security agreement to effectively create a security interest, the se-
curity agreement must establish attachment.66  Attachment re-
quires: (1) value to be given; (2) the debtor to have rights in the 
collateral; and (3) evidence of a voluntary lien by the debtor67 
“that provides a description of the collateral . . . .”68  Value given 
is similar to consideration; however, value given may be past or 
present value.69  In essence, there are no past consideration issues 
62. U.C.C. § 5-118(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
63. See § 5-102(a)(9), (11).
64. § 5-102(a)(6).
65. “‘Security agreement’ means an agreement that creates or provides for a security
interest.”  U.C.C § 9-102(a)(74) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). 
66. See U.C.C § 9-203(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
67. § 9-203(b)(1)-(3).
68. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
69. See § 9-203(b)(1) (requiring that “value has been given”); § 9-102(a)(57) (defining
“new value”). 
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as may be present under most contract formation requirements.70  
While mere naked possession is not enough to establish rights in 
the collateral,71 legal title is not required.72  Generally, it does not 
appear that the first two requirements for attachment pose a spe-
cific problem for virtual currency as collateral under Article 9.  
However, the third requirement for attachment, evidence of a vol-
untary lien, does create a problem as one must describe the col-
lateral for a security interest to attach.  How does a creditor 
properly describe the virtual currency in the security agreement?73 
A. Describing Collateral in a Security Agreement
The collateral description in the security agreement is suffi-
cient “if it reasonably identifies what is described.”74  What would 
be a reasonable identification for virtual currency?  A safe harbor 
for a reasonable identification is provided in sections 9-108(b), 
(d), and (e): 
(b) Examples of reasonable identification.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a description
of collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies
the collateral by:
(1) specific listing [such as “Ethan Allan maple dining
room set”75];
(2) category [for example, “crops”76 or “all machin-
ery”77];
(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a
type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial
Code;
(4) quantity [such as “three printing presses”78];
70. 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:13 (4th ed. 2019); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 86 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2019). 
71. See, e.g., Jerke Constr., Inc. v. Home Fed. Sav. Bank, 2005 SD 19, ¶ 12, 693
N.W.2d 59, 63. 
72. See, e.g., In re Whatley, 874 F.2d 997, 1004 (5th Cir. 1989).
73. See § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (requiring a description of the collateral).
74. U.C.C. § 9-108(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
75. § 9-108(b)(1); Jo M. Pasqualucci, Revised Article 9 in South Dakota with Emphasis
on Newly Included Agricultural Liens, 46 S.D. L. REV. 449, 462 (2001) (citing to S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-108(b) (Supp. 2000)). 
76. § 9-108(b)(2); Newsom v. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 259, at 8, 427
S.W.3d 688, 694. 
77. § 9-108(b)(2); Pasqualucci, supra note 75, at 462.
78. § 9-108(b)(3)-(4); Pasqualucci, supra note 75, at 462.
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(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure
[as in “one-half of all the grain produced”79]; or
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any
other method, if the identity of the collateral is objec-
tively determinable.
(d) Investment property.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a description
of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity
account is sufficient if it describes:
(1) the collateral by those terms or as investment prop-
erty; or
(2) the underlying financial asset or commodity con-
tract.
(e) When description by type insufficient.
A description only by type of collateral defined in the Uni-
form Commercial Code is an insufficient description of:
(1) a commercial tort claim; or
(2) in a consumer transaction, consumer goods, a secu-
rity entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity
account.80
In addition, a supergeneric description such as “all the debtor’s 
personal property” is not a reasonable identification.81  
As provided by section 9-108, descriptions of collateral may 
include non-statutory descriptions,82 however, most creditors pre-
fer to use the collateral defined by Article 9 as allowed by section 
9-108(b)(3), “a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code”83 in order to avoid the possibility that a court will
find that the collateral description is not sufficient.  Attempting to
describe collateral by specific listing, category, quantity, compu-
tational or allocational formula or procedure, or by any other
method if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable
has an element of uncertainty.  There is little case law on the suf-
ficiency of such collateral descriptions, and secondary sources
provide little guidance.  Accordingly, collateral descriptions spec-
ified in sections 9-108(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), & (6); 9-108(d); and 9-
79. § 9-108(b)(5); Pasqualucci, supra note 75, at 462.
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108(e) are not addressed in this paper.  It is clear that an identifi-
cation of collateral using the allowed UCC definitions as speci-
fied in section 9-108(b)(3) would be best to ensure a reasonable 
identification.  According to legal commentary, UCC-defined 
collateral that may apply to virtual currency includes account, de-
posit account, general intangible, instruments, investment prop-
erty, and money.84 
While there is no case law on-point at this time, we do have 
some administrative agencies that have defined virtual currency.  
For example, as indicated in Section II.A, the IRS has defined 
virtual currency as property.85  The IRS has further defined virtual 
currency as:  
[A] digital representation of value that functions as a me-
dium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of value.
In some environments, it operates like “real” currency—i.e.,
the coin and paper money of the United States or of any other
country that is designated as legal tender, circulates, and is
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in
the country of issuance—but it does not have legal tender
status in any jurisdiction.
Virtual currency that has an equivalent value in real cur-
rency, or that acts as a substitute for real currency, is referred 
to as “convertible” virtual currency.  Bitcoin is one example 
of a convertible virtual currency.  Bitcoin can be digitally 
traded between users and can be purchased for, or exchanged 
into, U.S. dollars, Euros, and other real or virtual curren-
cies.86 
According to this IRS definition, virtual currency could be de-
scribed as an account, a general intangible, an instrument, a pay-
ment intangible, a promissory note, or a negotiable instrument un-
der UCC Article 9.  The critical aspect of these categories is that 
virtual currency’s intended use is as a medium of exchange. 
84. See Ian A. Holcomb, Bitcoin’s Standing Within the Global Regulatory and Eco-
nomic Marketplace, 23 CURRENTS: J. INT’L ECON. L. 56, 61-62 (2016); see also Irina 
Marinescu, Market Making in Crypto—A Secured Lending Lawyer’s Learnings, 49 U.C.C. 
L.J. 159 (2019).
85. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 13.
86. Id.
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The CFTC has found virtual currency to be a commodity in 
virtual currency swap situations, as such transactions fall within 
the definition of “all services, rights, and interests . . . in which 
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt 
in.”87  The CFTC will regulate in the spot market for a virtual 
currency and in derivative markets involving a virtual currency.88 
In general, the CFTC defines virtual currency using the IRS 
definition.89  Further, the CFTC has provided a list of potential 
uses for virtual currency: 
Store of Value 
– Like precious metals, many virtual currencies are a “non-
yielding” asset (meaning they do not pay dividends or inter-
est), but they may be more fungible, divisible, and
portable
– Limited or finite supply of virtual currencies may contrast
with ‘real’ (fiat) currencies
Trading
– Trading in virtual currencies may result in capital gains or
losses
– Note that trading in virtual currencies may involve signifi-
cant speculation and volatility risk . . .
Payments and Transactions
– Some merchants and online stores are accepting virtual
currencies in exchange for
physical and digital goods (i.e., payments)
– Some public Blockchain systems rely on the payment of
fees in virtual currency form in order to power the network
and underlying transactions
Transfer / Move Money
– Domestic and international money transfer (e.g., remit-
tances) in order to increase
87. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2010); Fata & O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30.
88. CFTC PRIMER, supra note 15, at 11; Fata & O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30.  “The
spot market is where financial instruments, such as commodities, currencies and securities, 
are traded for immediate delivery.”  Tim Smith, Spot Market, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 19, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/6TZK-RNAE].  Swaps “involve the sale or purchase of [an asset or liabil-
ity] on one date and the offsetting purchase or sale . . . on a future date, with both dates agreed 
when the transaction is initiated.”  See MARC LEVINSON, GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MARKETS 
16 (4th ed. 2005); James Chen, Swap, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 4, 2020), [https://perma.cc/S6R3-
WM77].  “A derivative is a financial security with a value that is reliant upon or derived 
from, an underlying asset or group of assets . . . .”  James Chen, Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Jan. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/BW3N-YEPE]. 
89. CFTC PRIMER, supra note 15, at 4.
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efficiencies and potentially reduce related fees90 
By this definition, virtual currency used as a medium of ex-
change may be described as an account, a general intangible, an 
instrument, a payment intangible, a promissory note, or a nego-
tiable instrument under UCC Article 9.  However, Article 9 also 
provides for more specific collateral categories for commodities 
such as a commodity account or commodity contract.91  The prob-
lem is it depends upon the intended use. 
In 2017, an influx of initial coin offerings (ICOs) brought 
virtual currency to the attention of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).92  The SEC found that an ICO is a fundrais-
ing event similar to initial public offerings (IPOs).93  Many ICOs 
meet the definition of a security pursuant to the “investment con-
tract” test.94  Under the investment contract test, “an instrument is 
a security if it constitutes an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived 
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”95  In its 
July 25, 2017 report on Decentralized Autonomous Organization, 
the SEC concluded that the ICOs at issue were securities under 
the investment contract test.96  Further, virtual currency ex-
changes may be considered Securities Exchanges requiring regis-
tration compliance under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.97 
The SEC uses the Financial Action Task Force98 definition 
of virtual currency: 
90. Id. at 7.
91. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(14)-(15) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
92. ASS’N. OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS , ICOS: REAL DEAL OR TOKEN 
GESTURE?: EXPLORING INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS 5 (2018), [https://perma.cc/ZK5V-Q8C4]. 
93. Id.
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).  For the investment contract test announced by
the Supreme Court, see SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).  See also Fata & 
O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30. 
95. Fata & O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30; Howey, 328 U.S. at 298, 301.
96. SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(a) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO 1 (2017), [https://perma.cc/NJ7T-CV5T]. 
97. Fata & O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30.
98. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, The Financial Action Task Force, FINCEN,
[https://perma.cc/4TZY-B6Q3] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (“The Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental policymaking body whose purpose is to establish 
international standards, and to develop and promote policies, both at national and interna-
tional levels, to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  It was formed in 
1989 to set out measures to be taken in the fight against money laundering.”). 
2020 CRYPTO COLLATERAL 279 
[A] digital representation of value that can be digitally traded
and functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit
of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but does not have le-
gal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a valid
and legal offer of payment) in any jurisdiction.  It is not is-
sued nor guaranteed by any jurisdiction and fulfils the above
functions only by agreement within the community of users
of the virtual currency.  Virtual currency is distinguished
from fiat currency (a.k.a. “real currency,” “real money,” or
“national currency”), which is the coin and paper money of
a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and
is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange
in the issuing country.  It is distinct from e-money, which is
a digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically
transfer value denominated in fiat currency.99
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)100 defines 
virtual currency as: 
FinCEN’s regulations define currency (also referred to as 
“real” currency) as “the coin and paper money of the United 
States or of any other country that (i) is designated as legal 
tender and that (ii) circulates and (iii) is customarily used and 
accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issu-
ance.”  In contrast to real currency, “virtual” currency is a 
medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some 
environments, but does not have all the attributes of real cur-
rency.  In particular, virtual currency does not have legal ten-
der status in any jurisdiction.  This guidance addresses “con-
vertible” virtual currency.  This type of virtual currency 
either has an equivalent value in real currency, or acts as a 
substitute for real currency.101 
The definitions provided by the SEC, using the Financial Action 
Task Force definition, and FinCEN indicate that virtual currency 
used as a medium of exchange may be described as an account, a 
general intangible, an instrument, a payment intangible, a prom-
issory note, or a negotiable instrument.  However, virtual 
99. FATF REPORT, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL
AML/CFT RISKS, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 4 (June 2014), [https://perma.cc/PY7N-
LLMZ]. 
100. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, What We Do, FINCEN, [https://perma.cc/A543-
F3X9] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (“FinCEN is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury.”). 
101. FIN-2013-G001, supra note 32.
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currency may also be used as an investment.102  Article 9 also pro-
vides for more specific collateral categories for securities invest-
ments that may be applicable such as investment property, finan-
cial asset, or securities account.103  The problem is, again, it 
depends upon the intended use. 
B. UCC Collateral Categories
Suggested defined UCC collateral categories for virtual cur-
rency include account, deposit account, general intangible, instru-
ment, investment property, money, negotiable instrument, pay-
ment intangible, and promissory note.104   
i. Account
“Account”, except as used in “account for”, means a right to 
payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by 
performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, 
leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of . . . .  The 
term does not include (i) rights to payment evidenced by 
chattel paper or an instrument . . ., (iii) deposit accounts, (iv) 
investment property, (v) letter-of-credit rights or letters of 
credit, or (vi) rights to payment for money or funds advanced 
or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or 
charge card or information contained on or for use with the 
card.105 
The most common collateral that falls under the category of 
account is an account receivable.106  Assuming virtual currency is 
not a right to payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instru-
ment, a deposit account, or investment property (discussed be-
low), is it an account?  While the blockchain upon which virtual 
102. Thomas Lee Hazen, Virtual or Crypto Currencies and the Securities Laws, 38
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2018. 
103. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); see also
U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9), (15) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
104. Holcomb, supra note 84; Marinescu, supra note 84.  I have excluded from this
list defined collateral that does not appear to apply, including chattel paper, commercial tort 
claim, electronic chattel paper, farm products, fixtures, goods, equipment, health-care-insur-
ance receivable, tangible chattel paper, certificated security, check, lease, lease agreement, 
lease contract, and leasehold interest. 
105. § 9-102(a)(2).
106. See generally § 9-102(a)(2); Thomas E. Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under
Article 9: Structural Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (2007). 
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currency is based has been described as a “ledger,” it does not 
appear to constitute a right to payment like an account receivable.  
Such “right to payment” is for “property that has been or is to be 
sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed.”107  While 
one could argue that virtual currency, when sold, constitutes a 
right to payment, like other investments, investment property is 
specifically excluded from the UCC definition of account.108  Fur-
ther, converting virtual currency into fiat currency “is not really a 
monetary obligation for property sold.”109  It is more akin to the 
sale of an investment where the price will be determined by the 
market, not a fixed amount as with an account.110 
ii. Deposit Account
A “‘deposit account’ means a demand, time, savings, pass-
book, or similar account maintained with a bank.  The term does 
not include investment property or accounts evidenced by an in-
strument.”111  The critical part of the definition of a deposit ac-
count is that it exists only through an intermediary—a bank.112  
The term “bank” is defined in Section II.I.113  It is believed that 
virtual currency would not qualify as a deposit account, because 
neither blockchain nor virtual currency exchanges provide the 
functions described as the business of banking.114 
iii. General Intangible
Regarding “general intangibles,” they are defined as: “any 
personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, 
chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, docu-
ments, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit 
rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals 
107. See Marinescu, supra note 84.
108. Id.
109. Id.; § 9-102(a)(2).
110. See Marinescu, supra note 84.
111. § 9-102(a)(29).
112. Schroeder, supra note 11, at 22-23.
113. See supra Section II.I; § 9-102(a)(8).
114. See Marinescu, supra note 84; Schroeder, supra note 11, at 21-23; § 9-102(a)(8),
(29). 
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before extraction.  The term includes payment intangibles and 
software.”115 
A general intangible is a catchall category defined as the per-
sonal property that does not fall within any other Article 9 cate-
gory.116  It has been held to include such personal property intan-
gibles such as license rights,117 intellectual property,118 
expectation of recovery in a personal injury claim (excluding 
commercial tort claims),119 software,120 and likely a company’s 
customer database.121   
Most commentators seem to agree that the general intangible 
category is the most likely to apply to virtual currency.122  How-
ever, there is still the problem of uncertainty as it is not clear that 
virtual currency will be deemed personal property as required for 
a general intangible.123   
iv. Instrument
An “instrument” means: 
[A] negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences
a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself
a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary
course of business is transferred by delivery with any neces-
sary indorsement or assignment.  The term does not include
(i) investment property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings
that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a
credit or charge card or information contained on or for use
with the card.124
Section 3-104 defines a “negotiable instrument” as: 
115. § 9-102(a)(42).
116. § 9-102 cmt. 5d.
117. In re Media Properties, Inc., 311 B.R. 244, 247, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2004).
118. Rice v. Miller, 864 N.Y.S.2d 255, 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
119. In re Cohen, 305 B.R. 886, 903 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004).
120. Odinet, supra note 20, at 681.
121. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of
Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 458 (2018). 
122. Schroeder, supra note 11, at 30; Kevin V. Tu, Crypto-Collateral, 21 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 205, 223 (2018); Ronald J. Mann, Reliable Perfection of Security Interests in 
Crypto-Currency, SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 159, 163 (2018); Marinescu, supra note 84; 
Odinet, supra note 20, at 681. 
123. See supra Section II.A.
124. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(47) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added). 
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(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), “negotiable
instrument” means an unconditional promise or order to pay
a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other
charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is is-
sued or first comes into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction
by the person promising or ordering payment to do any
act in addition to the payment of money, but the prom-
ise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to
give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment,
(ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess
judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii)
a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the ad-
vantage or protection of an obligor.125
First, instruments reflect monetary obligations which, as stated in 
Section II.D, would exclude virtual currency.126  Second, the re-
quirement that a negotiable instrument reflect a “fixed amount of 
money” would exclude virtual currency because its value fluctu-
ates as a result of its volatility.127  Third, the definition of instru-
ment seems to require a “writing,” which is defined as “printing, 
typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible form.  
125. U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added).  The exceptions referenced, subsections (c) and (d) are not applicable.  Subsection 
(c) provides that “[a]n order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a), except par-
agraph (1), and otherwise falls within the definition of ‘check’ in subsection (f) is a negotia-
ble instrument and a check.”  § 3-104(c).  Subsection (f) defines a check as “a draft, other
than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or . . . a cashier’s check
or teller’s check.  An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by
another term, such as ‘money order.’”  § 3-104(f).  Virtual currency is not drawn on a bank,
cashier’s check or teller’s check.
Subsection (d) states that: 
A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued 
or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, 
however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is 
not an instrument governed by this Article.  
§ 3-104(d).  Virtual currency does not contain such “conspicuous statements.”
126. See supra Section II.D.
127. Tu, supra note 122, at 215; Nicolas Wenker, Note, Online Currency, Real-World
Chaos: The Struggle to Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 145, 193 
(2014).  For an example of virtual currency’s volatility, see Billy Bambrough, Bitcoin Moves 
Sharply Lower Again as Other Major Cryptocurrencies Go into Free Fall [Updated], 
FORBES (Dec. 16, 2019), [https://perma.cc/P79W-QH3A]. 
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‘Written’ has a corresponding meaning.”128  As indicated above, 
virtual currency is not tangible. 
Further, Comment 5(c) to section 9-102 states: “[t]he defini-
tion of ‘instrument’ includes a negotiable instrument. . . .  [I]t also 
includes any other right to payment of a monetary obligation that 
is evidenced by a writing of a type that in ordinary course of busi-
ness is transferred by delivery . . . .129  This, along with the defini-
tional language for instrument “or any other writing”130 confirms 
the writing requirement.   
Finally, “‘[d]elivery’ . . . with respect to an instrument, a tan-
gible document of title, or chattel paper, means voluntary transfer 
of possession.”131  “Possession” is not defined in the UCC but has 
been defined by case law as requiring physical possession,132 
which is not possible for intangibles.  For all of the above stated 
reasons, commentators have not advocated for instruments as the 
proper category for virtual currency.133 
v. Investment Property
“‘Investment property’ means a security, whether certifi-
cated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, 
commodity contract, or commodity account.”134  For the defini-
tion of a security, certificated security, uncertificated security, se-
curity entitlement, and securities account, we must consult Article 
8 of the UCC.135  “‘Certificated security’ means a security that is 
represented by a certificate.”136  Virtual currency does not have a 
tangible form like a certificate, so this definition does not apply.  
“‘Uncertificated security’ means a security that is not represented 
128. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(43) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
129. § 9-102 cmt. 5(c) (emphasis added).
130. § 9-102(a)(47).
131. § 1-201(b)(15).
132. See Schroeder, supra note 11, at 19; NBD-Sandusky Bank v. Ritter, 446 N.W.2d
340, 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).  Possession may also include constructive possession.  See, 
e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Gray, 2013-Ohio-3340, ¶ 25, 2013 WL 3963471, at *5; Farm
Credit of Nw. Fla. v. Easom Peanut Co., 718 S.E.2d 590, 599 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Georg v.
Metro Fixtures Contractors, Inc., 178 P.3d 1209, 1214 (Colo. 2008).
133. Marinescu, supra note 84; Tu, supra note 122, at 222-24.
134. § 9-102(a)(49).
135. § 9-102(b).
136. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(4) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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by a certificate.”137  Generally, this deals with securities that are 
evidenced by other means than a certificate, such as a book en-
try.138  Virtual currency may qualify if it meets the definition of 
security: 
[A]n obligation of an issuer or a share, participation, or other
interest in an issuer or in property or an enterprise of an is-
suer:
(i) which is represented by a security certificate in bearer or
registered form, or the transfer of which may be registered
upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of
the issuer;
(ii) which is one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible
into a class or series of shares, participations, interests, or
obligations; and
(iii) which:
(A) is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on securities
exchanges or securities markets; or
(B) is a medium for investment and by its terms ex-
pressly provides that it is a security governed by this
Article.139
The general consensus is that virtual currency would not meet this 
definition, as virtual currency reflects neither an obligation of any 
particular entity nor an interest in any cognizable entity or prop-
erty.140 
Some commentators opine that virtual currency may, in 
some cases, be a security under federal law definitions: 
Although [virtual currency] itself is not a stock or bond, cer-
tain [virtual currency] transactions could be characterized as 
a scheme devised by those who seek to use the money of 
others on the promise of profits.  As such, some [virtual cur-
rency] uses may fall within the broadly inclusive definition 
of a security, likely as an “investment contract” under the 
Howey test.141   
137. § 8-102(a)(18).
138. See, e.g., § 8-102 cmt. 18; Peter F. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Se-
curities Under Revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 
1014 (1979). 
139. § 8-102(a)(15).
140. Mann, supra note 122, at 162-63; Marinescu, supra note 84.
141. Tu, supra note 122, at 222.
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But as Article 9 specifically incorporates the definitions in Article 
8 for investment property,142 reference to federal law is inapplica-
ble.143  Even those commentators who opine that virtual currency 
may qualify as a security under federal law seem skeptical that it 
would qualify as investment property under Article 9 of the UCC: 
However, it appears unlikely that [virtual currency] would 
constitute a security in all cases. . . .  The implication for the 
categorization of [virtual currency] under Article 9 is rela-
tively clear.  Investment property as a collateral type does 
not appear to fully encompass [virtual currency].  Investment 
property is limited, by definition, to securities and the like. 
Notwithstanding the broad concept of “securities” under fed-
eral securities law, only some applications of [virtual cur-
rency], namely, ICOs, will constitute a security.  As a result, 
the Article 9 collateral category of “investment property” 
may not be applicable to [virtual currency] held by a poten-
tial borrower. 144 
While most commentators seem to be in agreement that vir-
tual currency is not a security, at least two commentators have 
argued that virtual currency may still be investment property as it 
meets the definition of “security entitlement” or “security ac-
count,” as virtual currency is a “financial asset.”145  The pertinent 
definitions here are as follows: 
“Security entitlement” means the rights and property interest 
of an entitlement holder with respect to a financial asset 
specified in Part 5.146 
“Securities account” means an account to which a financial 
asset is or may be credited in accordance with an agreement 
under which the person maintaining the account undertakes 
to treat the person for whom the account is maintained as 
entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the financial as-
set. 
142. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) cmt. 6, (b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
143. See Tu, supra note 122, at 221, 223.
144. Tu, supra note 122, at 222-23.
145. Marinescu, supra note 84; Holcomb, supra note 84, at 62.
146. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added). 
2020 CRYPTO COLLATERAL 287 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e),
a person acquires a security entitlement if a securities inter-
mediary:
(1) indicates by book entry that a financial asset has
been credited to the person’s securities account;
(2) receives a financial asset from the person or ac-
quires a financial asset for the person and, in either
case, accepts it for credit to the person’s securities ac-
count; or
(3) becomes obligated under other law, regulation, or
rule to credit a financial asset to the person’s securities
account.
(c) If a condition of subsection (b) has been met, a person
has a security entitlement even though the securities inter-
mediary does not itself hold the financial asset.
(d) If a securities intermediary holds a financial asset for an-
other person, and the financial asset is registered in the name
of, payable to the order of, or specially indorsed to the other
person, and has not been indorsed to the securities interme-
diary or in blank, the other person is treated as holding the
financial asset directly rather than as having a security enti-
tlement with respect to the financial asset.
(e) Issuance of a security is not establishment of a security
entitlement.147
“Financial asset,” except as otherwise provided in Section 8-103, 
means: 
(i) a security;
(ii) an obligation of a person or a share, participation, or
other interest in a person or in property or an enterprise of a
person, which is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on financial
markets, or which is recognized in any area in which it is
issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; or
(iii) any property that is held by a securities intermediary for
another person in a securities account if the securities inter-
mediary has expressly agreed with the other person that the
property is to be treated as a financial asset under this Article.
As context requires, the term means either the interest itself 
or the means by which a person’s claim to it is evidenced, 
147. U.C.C. § 8-501 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
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including a certificated or uncertificated security, a security cer-
tificate, or a security entitlement.148 
As indicated above, virtual currency is probably not a secu-
rity, so prong (i) does not apply.  It is contended that virtual cur-
rency meets prong (ii) for the definition of financial asset, as vir-
tual currency “fall[s] within the definition of a ‘financial asset’ 
because [it is] an[] ‘interest . . . in property . . . which is, or is of a 
type, dealt in or traded on financial markets, or which is recog-
nized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for 
investment.’”149  One problem with this argument is that it does 
not consider the Official Comments to the definition of financial 
asset which suggest that financial assets must be held in a security 
account150 to meet this definition.151  Prong (iii) has the same re-
quirement.152  While this requirement may be met in some circum-
stances, it requires an intermediary to hold the virtual currency, 
which may not be the most efficient use of virtual currency. 
Assuming virtual currency does meet the definition of in-
vestment property as a financial asset, it would functionally limit 
virtual currency to investments rather than a means of payment.  
Generally, collateral is categorized at the time of creation by the 
security agreement.153  Accordingly, if the debtor is holding the 
virtual currency as an investment at the time she enters into the 
148. § 8-102(a)(9).
149. Holcomb, supra note 84, at 62 (quoting § 8-102(a)(9)); see also Marinescu, supra
note 84. 
150. The official comment reads:
The fact that something does or could fall within the definition of financial asset
does not, without more, trigger Article 8 coverage.  The indirect holding system
rules of Revised Article 8 apply only if the financial asset is in fact held in a se-
curities account, so that the interest of the person who holds the financial asset
through the securities account is a security entitlement.  Thus, questions of the
scope of the indirect holding system rules cannot be framed as “Is such-and-such
a ‘financial asset’ under Article 8?”  Rather, one must analyze whether the rela-
tionship between an institution and a person on whose behalf the institution holds
an asset falls within the scope of the term securities account as defined in Section
8-501.  That question turns in large measure on whether it makes sense to apply
the Part 5 rules to the relationship.
§ 8-102 cmt. 9.
151. For an argument that bitcoin wallets are “securities accounts,” see Holcomb, su-
pra note 84, at 62. 
152. See Marinescu, supra note 84.
153. See, e.g., In re Palmer, 365 B.R. 816, 821 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (quoting In re
Troupe, 340 B.R. 86, 91 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2006)). 
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security agreement but subsequently uses it as a payment mecha-
nism, this should not create a problem for the initial collateral de-
scription.154  But, if virtual currency is meant to be a payment 
mechanism and is held for that purpose, it will not meet the defi-
nition of financial asset.155 
Finally, “commodity account” and “commodity contract” 
are probably not applicable definitions for virtual currency.  Com-
modity account and commodity contract are defined in Article 9: 
“Commodity account” means an account maintained by a 
commodity intermediary in which a commodity contract is 
carried for a commodity customer.156 
“Commodity contract” means a commodity futures contract, 
an option on a commodity futures contract, a commodity op-
tion, or another contract if the contract or option is: 
(A) traded on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that
has been designated as a contract market for such a contract
pursuant to federal commodities laws; or
(B) traded on a foreign commodity board of trade, exchange,
or market, and is carried on the books of a commodity inter-
mediary for a commodity customer.157
There are no commentators suggesting that virtual currency 
would fall within the definitions of commodity account or com-
modity contract.  This is probably due to the fact that virtual cur-
rency would not be considered a commodity.158  The UCC does 
not define “commodity,” but the term is generally defined as “a 
basic good used in commerce that is interchangeable with other 
goods of the same type.  Commodities are most often used as in-
puts in the production of other goods or services.  The quality of 
154. See id.  It does, however, create tracing and enforcement problems.
155. See § 8-102(a)(9).
156. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(14) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
157. § 9-102(a)(15).
158. However, the CFTC has found virtual currency to be a commodity in virtual cur-
rency swaps situations as such transactions fall within the definition of “all services, rights, 
and interests . . . in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”  
7 U.S.C. § 1a (2010).  See also CFTC PRIMER, supra note 15, at 11; Fata & O’Connell, supra 
note 13, at 30. 
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a given commodity may differ slightly, but it is essentially uni-
form across producers.”159 
“Goods” are defined under the UCC as: 
[A]ll things (including specially manufactured goods) which
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.
“Goods” also includes the unborn young of animals and
growing crops and other identified things attached to realty
as described in the section on goods to be severed from realty
(Section 2-107).160
These definitions would seem to suggest that commodities are 
goods.  Goods are moveable, suggesting a tangible rather than an 
intangible, such as virtual currency.  Accordingly, virtual cur-
rency would probably not qualify as a commodity account or 
commodity contract. 
vi. Money
While virtual currency may function as a payment mecha-
nism similar to money, it generally does not meet the definition 
of “money,” which is: “a medium of exchange currently author-
ized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government.  The term 
includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergov-
ernmental organization or by agreement between two or more 
countries.”161 
Virtual currency, such as bitcoin, is not fiat currency; that is 
to say it is not “a medium of exchange currently authorized or 
adopted by a domestic or foreign government.”162  It has been 
noted that one Indian tribe and one foreign country have adopted 
virtual currency as money.163  This would seem to meet the defi-
nitional requirement.164  However, specific types of virtual cur-
rency, such as bitcoin, have not been adopted by any government, 
159. James Chen, Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 14, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/5TMS-FP45] (emphasis added). 
160. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
161. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
162. § 1-201(b)(24).
163. Miller & Harrell, supra note 1; Tu, supra note 122, at 220-21; Mann, supra note
122, at 161-62. 
164. Schroeder, supra note 11, at 19.
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so it would not meet the definition of money.165  It has also been 
argued that the term money, as used in the UCC requires physical, 
or “hand-to-hand,” currency as evidenced by the fact that money 
does not include deposit accounts or other forms of storing medi-
ums of exchange.166  This seems to relegate money to the tangible 
category rather than an intangible where virtual currency re-
sides.167  Most commentators believe virtual currency would not 
meet the definition of money.168 
vii. Payment Intangible
A payment intangible is defined as “a general intangible un-
der which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary 
obligation.”169  Again, as discussed in Section II.E, the require-
ment of monetary obligation would eliminate virtual currency 
from this category.170 
viii. Promissory Note
As indicated in Section II.F, virtual currency does not qual-
ify as a promissory note because it is neither an instrument nor 
does it evidence a promise to pay a monetary obligation.171   
Virtual currency would, most likely, fall under the category 
of a general intangible, which seems to be the consensus of most 
commentators.172  That said, there is still uncertainty as a court 
has not ruled on this issue.  Additionally, even if virtual currency 
is deemed a general intangible, there are perfection and tracing 
problems as discussed in Parts IV and V below. 
165. Tu, supra note 122, at 220-21; Mann, supra note 122, at 161-62.
166. Schroeder, supra note 11, at 22-23.
167. Tu, supra note 122, at 220-21.
168. Miller & Harrell, supra note 1; Schroeder, supra note 11, at 10; Bob Lawless, Is
the UCC Article 9 the Achilles Heel of Bitcoin?, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 10, 2014), 
[https://perma.cc/QK4Y-WZKS]; Marinescu, supra note 84; Tu, supra note 122, at 220-21; 
Mann, supra note 122, at 161-62; Holcomb, supra note 84, at 61. 
169. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added). 
170. See discussion supra Section II.E.
171. See discussion supra Section II.F.
172. See sources cited supra note 122.
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IV. PERFECTION
Once a security interest has been created, meaning atttached, 
it must be perfected in order for a creditor/secured party to have 
priority vis-à-vis other creditors or to be deemed a secured credi-
tor if the debtor petitions for bankruptcy.173  Perfection is intended 
to provide public notice of a creditor’s security interest in the 
debtor’s collateral so subsequent creditors can determine if there 
is a creditor with priority over the collateral and if there is suffi-
cient collateral to protect further extensions of credit.174  The per-
fection mechanism to provide public notice is largely premised 
on commercial practices and feasibility based upon the type of 
collateral.175  To properly perfect, it is critical to have a clear un-
derstanding of collateral type, as some collateral types require a 
specific mechanism for proper perfection.  
There are four mechanisms for perfection: filing a financing 
statement,176 control,177 possession of the collateral,178 and auto-
matic perfection.179  Proper perfection depends on the category of 
collateral using the same collateral categories discussed above for 
description of the collateral under creation of the security interest.  
For example, if the virtual currency is considered an account, per-
fection must be by filing a financing statement.180  Deposit ac-
counts must be perfected by control.181  General intangibles must 
be perfected by filing a financing statement.182  A security interest 
in instruments or investment property may be perfected by filing 
a financing statement,183 however, priority over conflicting in-
vestment property security interests, where one is by filing and 
173. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1143, 1162 (1979). 
174. See Christopher G. Bradley, Disrupting Secured Transactions, 56 HOUS. L. REV.
965, 976-78 (2019). 
175. See Kristin N. Johnson et al., (Im)Perfect Regulation: Virtual Currency and Other
Digital Assets as Collateral, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 121 (2018). 
176. U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
177. U.C.C. § 9-312(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-
314(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). 
178. U.C.C. § 9-313 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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the other is by control—control has priority.184  Money must be 
perfected by possession.185 
A. Filing a Financing Statement
While the collateral description in a financing statement is 
more liberal than the collateral description in a security agree-
ment186 by allowing for supergeneric descriptions such as “all per-
sonal property,” it is still critical to properly perfect in order to 
have a security interest with priority and one that survives bank-
ruptcy.  As a practical matter, perfection by filing a financing 
statement creates a problem of enforcement for the creditor be-
cause the pseudo-anonymous nature of virtual currency makes it 
difficult to trace. 187  Additionally, this method of perfection cre-
ates a problem for transferees of virtual currency collateral be-
cause exceptions for buyers in the ordinary course of business,188 
which allow a transferee to take free and clear of security inter-
ests, only apply to goods, which as indicated above, would not 
include virtual currency.  In essence, the transferee of virtual cur-
rency may end-up accepting it subject to a security interest.  Ac-
cordingly, while perfection by filing may work for collateral that 
can be perfected by filing, virtual currency has the additional 
problems of security interest encumbrances and tracing issues as 
discussed more in Part V below. 
B. Perfection by Control
Perfection by control is required for deposit accounts: 
(a) Requirements for control.  A secured party has control of
a deposit account if:
184. § 9-312 cmts. 2, 4; U.C.C. § 9-328(1), (3), (5), cmts. 2, 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2019). 
185. § 9-312(b)(3).
186. In re ProvideRx of Grapevine, LLC, 507 B.R. 132, 163 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014).
187. Josias N. Dewey & Michael D. Emerson, Beyond Bitcoin: How Distributed
Ledger Technology Has Evolved to Overcome Impediments Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 47 U.C.C. L.J. 1 (2017); see Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 130, 140. 
188. U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 1-
201(b)(9) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 140; 
Schroeder, supra note 11, at 27; Lawless, supra note 168. 
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(1) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit
account is maintained;
(2) the debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in
an authenticated record that the bank will comply with
instructions originated by the secured party directing
disposition of the funds in the deposit account without
further consent by the debtor; or
(3) the secured party becomes the bank’s customer
with respect to the deposit account.
(b) Debtor’s right to direct disposition.  A secured party that
has satisfied subsection (a) has control, even if the debtor re-
tains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the de-
posit account.189
Section 9-104(a)(1) provides for control when the credi-
tor/secured party is a bank.190  As we have seen in Section II.I, to 
be a bank, the creditor/secured party must be in the business of 
banking.191  Section 9-104(a)(2) requires an authenticated agree-
ment by the bank giving the creditor/secured party access to the 
virtual currency.192  Again, we have the problem with the term 
bank as with subsection 1.  Section 9-104(a)(3) basically allows 
for a joint account mechanism over the deposit account or sole 
control over the account.193  As with subsection 1, subsections 2 
and 3 are difficult to apply to virtual currency as we may not have 
an intermediary that qualifies as a bank.194 
Perfection by control for investment property requires: 
(a) Control under Section 8-106.
A person has control of a certificated security, uncertificated
security, or security entitlement as provided in Section 8-
106.
(b) Control of commodity contract.
A secured party has control of a commodity contract if:
(1) the secured party is the commodity intermediary with
which the commodity contract is carried; or
189. U.C.C. § 9-104 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
190. § 9-104(a)(1), cmt. 3.
191. See supra Section II.I.
192. § 9-104(a)(2).
193. § 9-104(a)(3).
194. Miller, supra note 1; Marinescu, supra note 84; Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 141.
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(2) the commodity customer, secured party, and commodity
intermediary have agreed that the commodity intermediary
will apply any value distributed on account of the commod-
ity contract as directed by the secured party without further
consent by the commodity customer.195
Basically, Article 9 of the UCC looks to Article 8 of the UCC 
to define control for investment property, such as stock.196  “Con-
trol” under Article 8 requires: 
(a) A purchaser has “control” of a certificated security in
bearer form if the certificated security is delivered to the pur-
chaser.
(b) A purchaser has “control” of a certificated security in reg-
istered form if the certificated security is delivered to the pur-
chaser, and:
(1) the certificate is indorsed to the purchaser or in
blank by an effective indorsement; or
(2) the certificate is registered in the name of the pur-
chaser, upon original issue or registration of transfer by
the issuer.
(c) A purchaser has “control” of an uncertificated security if:
(1) the uncertificated security is delivered to the pur-
chaser; or
(2) the issuer has agreed that it will comply with in-
structions originated by the purchaser without further
consent by the registered owner.197
Virtual currency would not qualify as a certificated security 
because there is no tangible certificate.  As for uncertificated se-
curities, there is a requirement for one to be a registered owner, 
which is not possible for virtual currency.198  Further, there is a 
requirement of “delivery” of uncertificated securities, which is 
defined under Article 8 as occurring when “the issuer registers the 
purchaser as the registered owner, upon original issue or registra-
tion of transfer” or when “another person, other than a securities 
intermediary, either becomes the registered owner of the uncertif-
icated security on behalf of the purchaser or, having previously 
195. U.C.C. § 9-106(a)-(b)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
196. § 9-106(a).
197. U.C.C. § 8-106 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
198. U.C.C. § 8-301(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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become the registered owner, acknowledges that it holds for the 
purchaser.”199 
So, again, there is a requirement of a registered owner, which 
is a problem for virtual currency.  For commodity contracts, a 
commodity intermediary is required.200  As indicated in Section 
III.B.5, the use of an intermediary is not efficient for virtual cur-
rency.201
C. Perfection by Possession
As stated in Section III.B.4, the term possession is not de-
fined in the UCC but has been held to mean physical custody or 
constructive custody.202  As it is not possible to perfect an intan-
gible by possession,203 this is not a viable method of perfection for 
virtual currency.204 
D. Automatic Perfection
Automatic perfection does not apply to any of the relevant 
Article 9 categories discussed for virtual currency.205  As indi-
cated in Part III, virtual currency would most likely be considered 
a general intangible requiring perfection by filing.206  While this 
may resolve the issue of proper perfection, assuming a court 
agrees that virtual currency is a general intangible, given the tran-
sient nature of virtual currency, perfection by filing exacerbates 
the tracing problem. 
V. TRACING
Tracing is a necessary process under Article 9 of the UCC.  
Basically, because collateral is often left in the hands of the 
debtor,207 there is a problem regarding what happens when the 
199. § 8-301(b).
200. § 9-106(b).
201. See supra Section III.B.5.
202. See sources cited supra note 132; see also supra Section III.B.4.
203. Mann, supra note 122, at 163.
204. Id. at 163-64; Miller, supra note 1; Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 141.
205. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
206. See supra Section III.B.3.
207. Collateral left in the hands of the debtor occurs with perfection by filing.  It also
is the case with perfection by control, but the secured party has a greater opportunity to stop 
the transfer of collateral and to trace.  There is not a tracing problem with perfection by 
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debtor disposes of the collateral to a third party.  The general rule 
is that the security interest stays with the collateral in the hands of 
a third party.208  However, the secured party must be able to trace 
the collateral to ensure that the collateral in question is the collat-
eral to which the security interest has attached.209 
There are exceptions to the rule that the security interest 
stays with the collateral in the hands of a third party, such as the 
buyer in the ordinary course of business rule.210  However, a buyer 
in the ordinary course of business is defined as “a person that buys 
goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the 
rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course 
from a person . . . in the business of selling goods of that kind.”211  
As discussed in Section II.G, virtual currency does not qualify as 
a good, so this exception is most likely not applicable.212 
Another exception to the rule that the security interest stays 
with the collateral in the hands of the third party is the good faith 
purchaser for value exception, which states: 
Buyers that receive delivery. 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer, 
other than a secured party, of tangible chattel paper, docu-
ments, goods, instruments, or a certificated security takes 
free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the buyer 
gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without 
knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and be-
fore it is perfected.213 
possession.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-310, 9-313, 9-314, 9-328 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2019). 
208. Generally, a security agreement is effective against third parties.  U.C.C. § 9-
201(a), cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).  Typically, the security interest 
in the proceeds in the collateral continues unless the secured party authorized the disposition 
of the collateral free of that security interest.  U.C.C. § 9-315(a), cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); see also Evan Hewitt, Bringing Continuity to Cryptocurrency: 
Commercial Law as a Guide to the Asset Categorization of Bitcoin, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
619, 630 (2016). 
209. See § 9-315(a)-(b).
210. “[A] buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a security interest cre-
ated by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its 
existence.”  U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). 
211. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
212. See discussion supra Section II.G; see also Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 140;
Hewitt, supra note 208, at 631. 
213. U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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The exception specified in subsection (e) relates to purchase 
money security interests which is not applicable to the tracing is-
sue and, thus, not addressed in this analysis.  As for the remainder 
of the good faith purchaser for value exception, it is limited to 
collateral that qualifies as “tangible chattel paper, tangible docu-
ments, goods, instruments, or a certificated security.”214  As indi-
cated in Parts II and III, virtual currency would most likely not 
qualify as tangible chattel paper, documents, goods, instruments, 
or a certificated security.215  Additionally, there is the problem of 
the requirement that the buyer “receives delivery.”  As stated in 
Section III.B.4, delivery requires possession which is not possible 
for intangibles like virtual currency.216 
Finally, if the collateral is considered money a third-party 
transferee of that money will take the collateral free of any secu-
rity interest.217  As explained in Section III.B.6, virtual currency 
does not meet the definition of money.218 
As discussed above, if it is possible to create and perfect a 
security interest in virtual currency, the most likely possibility 
would be as a general intangible perfected by filing.  This creates 
a tracing problem, as once the virtual currency is transferred to a 
third party, it is impossible to reverse the transaction, and transfer 
transactions are pseudonymous.219  Thus, identifying the third-
party holder of the collateral with the security interest would be 
difficult. 
However, if it was possible to identify the virtual currency 
collateral in the hands of a third-party transferee, this would mean 
that some third party may have to turn over the virtual currency 
to the secured party.  True, the UCC Article 9 notice mechanisms 
are meant to protect third parties by giving them notice of security 
interests,220 but is it commercially efficient to require a check of 
Article 9 financing statements every time one transacts in virtual 
214. § 9-317(d).
215. See supra Parts I-II.
216. See supra Section III.B.4; see also § 1-201(b)(15); Schroeder, supra note 11, at
19; NBD-Sandusky Bank v. Ritter, 446 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
217. U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); Schroeder, su-
pra note 11, at 23; Hewitt, supra note 208, at 631-32. 
218. See supra Section III.B.6.
219. Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 141; Wenker, supra note 127.
220. Bradley, supra note 174, at 977-78.
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currency?  The end result would likely be a third party who did 
not check Article 9 financing statements learning that there is a 
lien on the virtual currency.221 
Given the benefits of liquidity for virtual currency, the ex-
pectation that a third party would check to see if there is a security 
interest attached to virtual currency reduces that liquidity.  In-
deed, it is commercial efficiency and the benefits of liquidity with 
regard to money that prompted the drafters of UCC Article 9 to 
exclude money from the rule that a security interest follows the 
collateral in the hands of a third party.222  Accordingly, the ineffi-
ciencies of the current Article 9 system with regard to the practi-
cal ability of a secured party to trace and enforce security interests 
in virtual currency creates additional problems of uncertainty and 
risks for secured-party creditors. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Article 9 of the UCC in its present form has too many risks 
for creditors who want to accept virtual currency as collateral.  
Does virtual currency fall under the scope of Article 9?  If it does, 
under what collateral category for purposes of creation of the se-
curity interest and perfection?  If we can create a security interest 
in virtual currency and perfect that interest, how do subsequent 
creditors know there is a security interest in specific virtual cur-
rency, and how does a secured party trace the collateral?  We do 
not have definitive answers to these questions as the courts have 
yet to rule on these issues, and the Joint Study Committee on the 
Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging Technologies has yet 
to issue any suggestions.  This uncertainty for virtual currency as 
collateral reduces the likelihood it will be accepted as collateral 
under the present laws223 and underscores the need to clarify the 
law.  
221. See Hewitt, supra note 208, at 630-31; Lawless, supra note 168.
222. See § 9-332 cmt. 3.
223. See Hewitt, supra note 208, at 631; Lawless, supra note 168.
